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A Formal Approach to Article 
38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute 
from the Perspective of  the 




This article offers an interpretation of  Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute based on the for-
mal pronouncements of  international criminal courts and tribunals, distilled from their 
judgments. It considers that the qualification ‘subsidiary’ is meant neither to distinguish the 
means from the primary sources nor to denote ‘of  lesser importance’. It further examines the 
verification process envisaged in ‘the determination of  rules of  law’, as well as the more direct 
impact of  judicial decisions vis-à-vis the teachings of  publicists.
1 Introduction
Shahabuddeen observes that, although in the past Article 38(1)(d) of  the Statute of  
the International Court of  Justice (ICJ Statute)1 may not have presented any special 
difficulty of  interpretation, that view is not generally shared today.2 Various view-
points have been put forward on the proper role of  judicial decisions (and, to a lesser 
extent, teachings of  the most highly qualified publicists) in the context of  debates on 
sources of  international law.3 This article offers an interpretation of  Article 38(1)(d) 
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1 UN, Statute of  the International Court of  Justice, 18 Apr. 1946. Para. 2 of  Art. 38 will not be examined 
in this article.
2 M. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (1996), at 7.
3 These include Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of  International Law’, 
in M.  Koskenniemi, Sources of  International Law (2000); Jennings, ‘The Judiciary, International and
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of  the ICJ Statute based on the formal pronouncements of  the international criminal 
courts and tribunals.4
The article explores the meaning of  the phrase ‘as subsidiary means for the deter-
mination of  rules of  law’ in Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute and takes the view 
that ‘determination’ comprises: (1) a verification of  the existence and state of  rules 
of  law; and (2) a verification of  the proper interpretation of  rules of  law (the ‘verifica-
tion process’). It holds that the qualification ‘subsidiary’ is not intended merely to 
denote that judicial decisions cannot be accorded the status of  sources;5 rather, this 
term serves to qualify the means in relation to the court or tribunal undertaking the 
determination. It proceeds to consider which judicial decisions are properly envis-
aged in Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute, considering the case of  judicial decisions 
connected to law-creating processes and judicial decisions connected to national 
law. Finally, although this sub-paragraph treats judicial decisions and teachings of  
publicists as it were in the same breath,6 the article takes the view that an approach 
which fails to take account of  the more direct impact of  judicial decisions should be 
avoided.7
2 The Enduring Significance of  Article 38(1) of  the ICJ 
Statute
The principle of  legality, enshrined in Article 15 of  the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),8 to a large extent necessitates the formal approach 
adopted by the international criminal courts and tribunals with respect to sources 
of  international law.9 These sources are authoritatively listed in Article 38(1) of  the 
National, and the Development of  International Law’, 45 ICLQ (1996) 1; Oppenheim, ‘The Science of  
International Law: Its Task and Method’, in M.D. Evans and P. Capps, International Law (2009) (originally 
published in 2 AJIL (1908)); Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals (3rd edn, 1957); and Shahabuddeen, supra note 2.
4 The jurisprudence of  the following international criminal courts and tribunals has been considered: the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR); the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL); the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of  Cambodia (ECCC); and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
5 G.J.H. Van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of  International Law (1983), at 170.
6 Jennings, supra note 3, at 6.
7 Fitzmaurice, supra note 3, at 168.
8 UN GA, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, 999 UNTS 171, available at: 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html (accessed 12 Sept. 2012).
9 See, inter alia, Report of  the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of  Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993, at 34; Art. 33 new of  the ECCC Law, 27 Oct. 2004, ref. NS/RKM/1004/006; 
and Art. 22 of  the Rome Statute of  the ICC, 17 July 1998, ref. A/CONF.183/9. With respect to the affirma-
tion of  this principle in the jurisprudence see, inter alia, United States v. Wilhelm List et al. (‘Hostage case’), 
US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of  19 Feb. 1948, in 10 Trials of  War Criminals Before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law, Vol. XI/2, at 1240; Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, 
Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic, Vladimir Santic, also known as ‘Vlado’, 
Judgment, IT-95-16-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 14 Jan. 2000, at 540 (‘Kupreskic et al. Trial Judgment’); and 
Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, Judgment, Case: IT-98-32-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 29 Nov. 2002, at 202.
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ICJ Statute.10 Although, in principle, Article 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute professes only to 
provide a direction to the ICJ, authorizing it to consider various materials when decid-
ing disputes submitted to it,11 this Article has come to constitute the foundation stone 
for any credible discussion on sources of  international law,12 and an inquiry into this 
subject inescapably has to begin with it.13 The ad hoc Tribunals have regularly had 
recourse to Article 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute in this manner.14 Moreover, where newer 
international criminal courts and tribunals have incorporated their own provisions 
on applicable law, their lists have broadly followed the approach to sources enshrined 
in Article 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute.15
In view of  the above, although this Article has been criticized, inter alia, for being 
under-inclusive or for including aspects which are not genuine sources,16 it would 
be a mistake to underestimate the enduring significance of  Article 38(1) of  the ICJ 
Statute.17 The next section briefly considers the drafting of  the precursor to Article 
38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute before examining the individual elements of  this article, 
starting from the meaning of  the phrase ‘as subsidiary means for the determination 
of  rules of  law’.
3 Some Considerations Concerning Article 38(1)(d) of  the 
ICJ Statute
When the precursor to Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute was being drafted by the 
1920 Advisory Committee of  Jurists, President Descamps proposed a text which read:
4. international jurisprudence as a means for the application and development of  law.18
This phrase is not entirely free from ambiguity, because it simultaneously uses 
the words ‘application’ and ‘development’. The former entails a reference to already 
10 See P. Malanczuk (ed.) Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, 1997), at 1.
11 Fitzmaurice, supra note 3, at 173. See also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a ‘Dule’, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 2 Oct. 1995, at 43.
12 R. McCorquodale and M. Dixon, Cases and Materials on International Law (4th edn, 2003), at 19.
13 Jennings, ‘What is International Law and How Do We Tell It When We See It?’, in Koskenniemi, supra note 
3, at 60.
14 See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic also known as ‘Pavo’, Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo 
also known as ‘Zenga’, Judgment, IT-96-21-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 16 Nov. 1998, at 414 (‘Čelebići Trial 
Judgment’); and Kupreskic et al. Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at 540; and Prosecutor v. Dragen Erdemovic, 
Judgment, Joint Separate Opinion of  Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Case No. IT-96-22-A, ICTY 
Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997, at 40 (‘Erdemovic Appeals Judgment’).
15 For instance, with respect to Art. 21 of  the Rome Statute of  the ICC, Cryer maintains that this Art. does 
little more than restate the traditional formal position of  judicial decisions in international law: see Cryer, 
‘Neither Here Nor There? The Status of  International Criminal Jurisprudence in the International and UK 
Legal Orders’, in K.H. Kaikobad and M. Bohlander, International Law and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order 
and Justice: Essays in Honour of  Colin Warbrick (2009), at 191. See also, inter alia, Rule 72bis of  the SCSL 
Rules of  Procedure, 12 Apr. 2002 (available from the SCSL website).
16 Malanczuk, supra note 10, at 36. See also Koskenniemi, supra note 3, at xi.
17 M.M.A. Dixon, Textbook on International Law (6th edn, 2007), at 24.
18 Shahabuddeen, supra note 2, at 52.
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existing law, while the latter implies at least some element of  newness and sug-
gests that judicial decisions could, in a sense, be a source of  law.19 A subsequent text 
introduced reference to the ‘opinions of  writers’, but otherwise did not resolve this 
ambiguity.
However, the records of  the debate on judicial decisions within the Advisory 
Committee very clearly show that its members did not consider such decisions as a 
source of  international law in the proper sense of  that term.20 In answer to a ques-
tion by Ricci-Busatti, President Descamps stated unequivocally that ‘[d]octrine and 
jurisprudence no doubt do not create law; but they assist in determining rules which 
exist. A judge should make use of  both jurisprudence and doctrine, but they should 
only serve as elucidation.’21
While this statement by Descamps left no room for doubt as to his opinion, it did not 
completely satisfy Ricci-Busatti. Faced with continued opposition, Descamps finally 
suggested, as a compromise, the following wording: ‘[t]he Court shall take into con-
sideration judicial decisions and the teachings of  the most highly qualified publicists 
of  the various nations as a subsidiary means for the determination of  rules of  law’.
The final text of  this sub-paragraph, therefore, not only removed all mention of  
judicial decisions as a means for the development of  the law; there was also explicit 
agreement amongst the drafters that judicial decisions were not, in any sense, envis-
aged as primary sources of  law. Finally, and also of  note, while President Descamps’ 
initial text referred to ‘international’ jurisprudence, the final sub-paragraph did not 
qualify the type of  judicial decisions intended and, in particular, did not distinguish 
between ‘international’ and ‘national’ decisions.
A The Distinction Between Law-Creating Processes and Law-
Determining Agencies in Article 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute
A review of  the literature indicates considerable divergence over the proper interpre-
tation of  Article 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute. One view is that that Article, in effect, lays 
down one, global list of  sources of  international law. From this perspective, the judicial 
decisions referred to in sub-paragraph (d) may constitute as much a source of  law as 
any of  the other sources listed in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of  Article 38(1). Jennings, 
for instance, asserts that, ‘I see the language of  Article 38 as essential in principle and 
see no great difficulty in seeing a subsidiary means for the determination of  rules of  
law as being a source of  the law, not merely by analogy but directly’.22
Another view, however, is that Article 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute establishes two dis-
tinct lists. From this perspective, the first list (sub-paragraphs (a) to (c)) lays down 
exhaustively the formal sources from which legally valid rules of  international law 
may emerge. The second list (sub-paragraph (d)) lays down some of  the means by 
19 Van Hoof, supra note 5, at 169.
20 Ibid., at 169.
21 PCIJ, Proces Verbaux of  the Proceedings of  the Committee (1920), Advisory Committee of  Jurists, 16 June–
24 July 1920, at 336. See also Van Hoof, supra note 5, at 170.
22 Jennings, supra note 3, at 3–4. See also Shahabuddeen, ‘Judicial Creativity and Joint Criminal Enterprise’, 
in S. Darcy and J. Powderly, Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (2010), at 186.
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which such rules of  law may be determined. One of  the main proponents of  this view, 
Schwarzenberger, states:
This paragraph deals with two different issues. Sub-paragraphs (a)–(c) are concerned with the 
pedigree of  the rules of  international law. In sub-paragraph (d), some of  the means for the 
determination of  alleged rules of  international law are enumerated.23
This approach, which is supported by a consideration of  the drafting history,24 also 
closely reflects the formal approach to Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute consistently 
adopted by the international criminal courts and tribunals in their judgments. For 
instance, in Kupreskic et al., the ICTY Trial Chamber stated:
Being international in nature and applying international law principaliter, the Tribunal cannot 
but rely upon the well-established sources of  international law and, within this framework, upon 
judicial decisions. What value should be given to such decisions? The Trial Chamber holds the 
view that they should only be used as a ‘subsidiary means for the determination of  rules of  law’ 
… Clearly, judicial precedent is not a distinct source of  law in international criminal adjudication.25
Similarly, although Article 20(3) of  the Statute of  the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(the SCSL Statute) specifies that ‘[t]he judges of  the Appeals Chamber of  the Special 
Court shall be guided by the decisions of  the Appeals Chamber of  the International 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda’, the SCSL has underscored that 
this provision should not, in any way, be construed as implying that the judicial deci-
sions of  the ICTY and the ICTR may constitute direct sources.26
From this perspective, therefore, Article 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute gives rise to two dis-
tinct categories: (1) three named ‘law-creating processes’ which constitute the formal 
sources of  international law; and (2) two named ‘law-determining agencies’ which 
constitute subsidiary means for the determination of  rules of  antecedent law.27
Turning to the specific wording of  Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute, first, although 
the phrase ‘rules of  law’ in this sub-paragraph does not specify which law is intended 
– whether national or international – it is clear from the chapeau to this Article, which 
provides that the Court is bound to decide ‘in accordance with international law’, that 
this phrase refers to ‘rules of  international law’.
While the term ‘to determine’ is capable of  more than one meaning,28 Shahabuddeen 
notes that ‘[t]he argument is strong … that the reference to “the determination of  rules 
of  law” visualised a decision which would merely elucidate the existing law, and not 
bring new law into being’.29 Although the author goes on to discuss a different inter-
pretation of  the term,30 a review of  the judgments of  the international criminal courts 
23 Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 26–28.
24 Van Hoof, supra note 5, at 169.
25 Kupreskic et al. Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at 540, emphasis added.
26 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, SCSL 
Trial Chamber, 2 Mar. 2009, at 295 (‘RUF Trial Judgment’). See also Cryer, supra note 15, at 188.
27 Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 26–28.
28 Other meanings of  the term ‘to determine’ include ‘to settle’, ‘to ordain’, and ‘to decree’: see 
Shahabuddeen, supra note 2, at 77.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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and tribunals indicates that they have construed this term in the sense of  ‘for the veri-
fication of ’.31 This is also the meaning Schwarzenberger assigns to that phrase when 
he considers that ‘[w]hereas, in the case of  the law-creating processes, the emphasis 
lies on the forms by which any particular rule of  international law is created, in the 
case of  the law-determining agencies it is on how an alleged rule is to be verified’.32
The question, then, is how is an alleged rule to be verified? It is submitted that the 
end, specified in Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute, of  ‘the determination of  rules of  
law’ may be attained by the following means:
 1.  A verification of  the ‘existence’ and ‘state’ of  rules of  law at the relevant time. 
(For example, a review of  state practice and opinio juris to establish whether a 
particular rule of  customary international law was recognized at the time of  
the offences alleged.)
 2.  A verification of  the ‘proper’33 (or ‘accurate’)34 interpretation of  rules of  law.35 
(For example, in Stakic, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that ‘when interpreting 
the relevant substantive criminal norms’, the Chamber could be guided by 
judicial decisions.)36
The above process (the ‘verification process’) broadly corresponds to what Cassese 
describes as the ‘wise’ approach, whereby judicial decisions are used ‘in order to 
establish (i) whether a customary international rule has formed, or (ii) whether a general 
principle of  international law exists, or to determine (iii) whether the interpretation of  an 
international rule adopted by another judge is convincing and, if  so, applicable’.37
31 For instance, in his Declaration in the Furundzija appeal, Judge Robinson held, ‘[t]he Chamber’s examination 
of  decisions of  national courts and international tribunals … could provide a sufficient foundation for a deter-
mination as to whether a rule of  custom had emerged …’: Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgment, Declaration 
of  Judge Patrick Robinson, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 21 July 2000, at 288. The ECCC 
Trial Chamber in Duch held, ‘[t]he principle of  legality prevents neither a reliance on unwritten custom nor 
a determination through a process of  interpretation and clarification as to the elements of  a particular crime’: 
Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Judgment, Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, ECCC Trial Chamber, 
26 July 2010, at 290 (‘Duch Trial Judgment’). emphasis added. See also The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, 
Judgment, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, ICTR Trial Chamber, 15 May 2003, at 312 (‘Semanza Trial Judgment’).
32 Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 26–27, emphasis added.
33 The Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura Emmanuel Bagambiki Samuel Imanishimwe, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-99-
46-A, ICTR Appeals Chamber, 7 July 2006, at 127 (‘Ntagerura et al. Appeals Judgment’). See also R. Dixon 
and K.A.A. Khan, Archbold, International Criminal Courts: Practice, Procedure and Evidence (3rd edn, 2009), 
at 154. The principles of  interpretation are themselves derived from one or more of  the sources of  law 
listed in Art. 38(1)(a) to (c) of  the ICJ Statute, such as from the VCLT. See, for instance, Semanza Trial 
Judgment, supra note 31, at 336.
34 See Čelebići Trial Judgment, supra note 14, at 160. See also Ntagerura et al. Appeals Judgment, supra note 
33, at 127.
35 Jennings notes that ‘[o]f  course we all know that interpretation does, and indeed should, have a creative 
element in adapting rules to new situations and needs, and therefore also in developing it even to an 
extent that might be regarded as changing it. Nevertheless, the principle that judges are not empowered 
to make new law is a basic principle of  the process of  adjudication. Any modification and development 
must be seen to be within the parameters of  permissible interpretation’: see Jennings, supra note 3, at 3.
36 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Judgment, IT-97-24-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003, at 414.
37 Cassese, ‘The Influence of  the European Court of  Human Rights on International Criminal Tribunals 
– Some Methodological Remarks’, in M.  Bergsmo (ed.), Human Rights and Criminal Justice For the 
Downtrodden: Essays in Honour of  Asbjorn Eide (2003), at 20, emphasis in original.
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However, Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute specifies not only the end, namely ‘for 
the determination of  rules of  law’, but also the status of  the two law-determining 
agencies as ‘subsidiary means’ to this end. Schwarzenberger points out that ‘[i]t fol-
lows that principal means for the determination of  rules of  law must exist’.38 The ques-
tion is, therefore, which are these principal means?
The verification process described above is generally undertaken by a court or tribu-
nal by way of  a first-hand determination of  the existence, state, and proper interpreta-
tion of  the relevant rules of  law. For instance, a court or tribunal may verify the state 
of  a rule of  customary international law at the relevant time by means of  an inductive 
review of  state practice and opinio juris. It may also verify the proper construction of  
a treaty provision by means of  direct interpretation. These first-hand means for the 
determination of  rules of  law may be characterized as ‘principal means’.
However, the court or tribunal (or other agency) could cast its net wider and sup-
plement these principal means of  verification with ‘subsidiary means’, namely judi-
cial decisions from other courts and tribunals (‘external judicial decisions’) and the 
teachings of  publicists, who may have considered the same or similar legal issues, and 
whose reasoning may therefore inform the court or tribunal’s own analysis. These 
means would be characterized as ‘subsidiary’ because they would not have issued 
directly from the court or tribunal itself. Rather, they would have been undertaken, 
as it were, by ‘third parties’ and, in relation to the court or tribunal, would constitute 
second-hand (or ‘subsidiary’) means. It should be evident that ‘principal’ and ‘subsid-
iary’ means for the determination of  rules of  law are not mutually exclusive. On the 
contrary, they could supplement each other.
The characterization ‘subsidiary’ in Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute should not 
therefore be seen as an assessment of  the relative importance of  judicial decisions (or 
teachings of  publicists) in the determination of  rules of  law. It should not be inter-
preted as meaning that such judicial decisions are of  ‘lesser importance’. Indeed, 
some authors have cautioned that ‘the practical significance of  the label “subsidiary 
means” in Article 38(1)(d) is not to be exaggerated’39 because ‘the authority and per-
suasive power of  judicial decisions may sometimes give them greater significance than 
they enjoy formally’.40
Similarly, an interpretation which views the qualification ‘subsidiary’ merely ‘to 
reflect the intention of  the drafters of  article 38 that judicial decisions cannot be 
accorded the status of  sources in the formal sense of  that term, that is in the same sense 
as treaties, custom and general principles were meant to be sources of  international 
law’,41 should likewise be avoided. From the perspective that law-creating processes 
in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of  Article 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute, and law-determining 
agencies in sub-paragraph (d), constitute distinct lists, it would appear misleading to 
38 Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 26–28, emphasis added.
39 I. Brownlie, Principles of  Public International Law (4th edn, 1990), at 19.
40 L.F.L. Oppenheim, et al., Oppenheim’s International Law. Vol.1, (Peace) (9th edn, ed. Sir Robert Jennings 
and Sir Arthur Watts,(1992), at 41. See also Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of  National Courts as Sources of  
International Law: An Analysis of  the Practice of  the ICTY’, in G. Boas and W. Schabas, International 
Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of  the ICTY (2003), at 290.
41 Van Hoof, supra note 5, at 170.
656 EJIL 24 (2013), 649–661
view the ‘means’ as some kind of  ‘subsidiary sources’.42 While there is no question 
that law-determining agencies are subordinate to law-creating processes in the sense 
that the former are necessarily dependant on, and secondary to, the latter,43 to con-
strue this phrase as merely denoting this apparent fact would appear superfluous.
The designation ‘subsidiary’ in Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute serves to qualify 
the means in relation to the court or tribunal undertaking the determination. Where 
the court or tribunal undertakes the determination of  rules of  law through first-hand 
means, such as through judicial interpretation, such means may be characterized as 
‘principal’. Where, however, the court or tribunal relies on second-hand means in its 
verification process, such as external judicial decisions or teachings of  publicists, such 
means may be characterized as ‘subsidiary’ (in French, ‘moyen auxiliaire’).
A relevant consideration at this stage is whether it may be possible to envisage other 
subsidiary means not expressly mentioned in Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute. This 
possibility is certainly admitted by Schwarzenberger, who holds that sub-paragraph 
(d) lists only ‘some of  the means for the determination of  the alleged rules of  interna-
tional law’.44 The international law landscape has developed significantly since this 
sub-paragraph was originally drafted in 1920, and today additional instruments may 
be seen properly to qualify as ‘subsidiary means’ for the determination of  rules of  law. 
These may include the work of  the International Law Commission45 and the work of  
the International Committee of  the Red Cross and Red Crescent, such as its study on 
customary international humanitarian law.46 Both of  these instruments have been 
used widely as subsidiary means in the practice of  international criminal courts and 
tribunals.47
One view, therefore, is that Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute does not establish an 
exhaustive list of  subsidiary means, and additional means may be considered to fall 
within the scope of  this sub-paragraph. However, the danger with this approach is 
42 See, for instance, Boas et al., who assert that Art. 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute ‘refers to three primary sources 
and one subsidiary source’: G. Boas, J.L.J.D. Bischoff, and N.L. Reid, Elements of  Crimes under International 
Law (2008), at 5, emphasis added. Van Hoof  notes that judicial decisions cannot really be qualified as 
‘subsidiary sources’: Van Hoof, supra note 5, at 169. The term ‘source’, instead of  ‘means’, has sometimes 
also been used in the judgments of  international criminal courts and tribunals themselves. For instance, 
in Brdanin, the ICTY Appeals chamber held, ‘[t]he post-World War II jurisprudence mentioned above, 
which has been interpreted as a valid source for the ascertainment of  the contours of  joint criminal enter-
prise liability in customary international law’: Prosecutor v.  Radoslav Brdanin, Judgment, IT-99-36-A, 
ICTY Appeals Chamber, 3 Apr. 2007, at 415, emphasis added.
43 Oppenheim, et al., supra note 40, at 41.
44 Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 26–28, emphasis added.
45 For more information on the work of  the ILC visit: www.un.org/law/ilc/ (last accessed 2 Oct. 2012).
46 For more information on the ICRC’s study visit: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/
customary-law-statement-210705.htm (last accessed: 2 Oct. 2012).
47 With respect to the work of  the ILC see, inter alia, The Prosecutor v.  Tihomir Blaskic, Judgment, IT-95-
14-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 3 Mar. 2000, at 205; and Kaing Guek Eav alias ‘Duch’, Appeal Judgment, Case 
File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, ECCC Supreme Court Chamber, 3 Feb. 2012, at 114–115. 
With respect to the ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law see Prosecutor v. Stanislav 
Galić, Judgment, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of  Judge Schomburg, IT-98-29-A, ICTY 
Appeals Chamber, 30 Nov. 2006, at 19; Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Judgment, IT-97-24-A, ICTY Appeals 
Chamber, 22 Mar. 2006, at 296; and Duch Trial Judgment, supra note 31, at 541 (n. 1646).
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that it seems to dissonate with the approach that the lists in Article 38(1) of  the ICJ 
Statute are exhaustive. A more satisfactory approach is perhaps to view such means 
as falling within the broad rubric of  ‘the teachings of  the most highly qualified publi-
cists of  the various nations’.
The next section will consider which judicial decisions are properly envisaged by 
Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute.
1. Judicial Decisions Connected to Law-creating Processes
Article 38(l)(d) of  the ICJ Statute refers to ‘judicial decisions’ in broad and unquali-
fied terms.48 While it is generally accepted that this reference covers a broad range of  
judicial decisions,49 a review of  the literature indicates considerable divergence over 
which judicial decisions are properly envisaged by this sub-paragraph. For instance, 
some commentators hold that the reference to ‘judicial decisions’ in Article 38(1)(d) 
of  the ICJ Statute includes judicial decisions used as evidences of  customary interna-
tional law.50 This position is, however, not shared by others.51
It is well known that judicial decisions, particularly national ones, can play a pivo-
tal function as evidences of  customary international law.52 The Permanent Court of  
International Justice considered national judicial decisions as ‘facts which express the 
will and constitute the activities of  States’.53 Large parts of  customary international 
law have been developed in accordance with the practice of  the judicial decisions of  
national courts.54
As discussed, some authorities have regarded judicial decisions used for this purpose 
as falling within the scope of  Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute.55 However, judicial 
decisions used as evidences of  customary international law are more intimately con-
nected with the law-creating processes, and their consideration under Article 38(1)
(d) risks muddying the distinction between law-creating processes and law-determin-
ing agencies. As such, they are more appropriately considered under Article 38(1)
(b), rather than Article 38(1)(d).56 The same reasoning applies to all judicial decisions 
used as material sources of  rules of  international law, such as judicial decisions used 
in identifying (or negating) general principles of law.
This view is bolstered by the fact that, had judicial decisions as evidence of  custom-
ary international law been envisaged by Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute, it would 
appear illogical that this sub-paragraph expressly names only two types of  evidence, 
48 Jennings, supra note 3, at 6.
49 Ibid.
50 Brownlie, supra note 39, at 23.
51 See, for instance, Jia, ‘Judicial Decisions as a Source of  International Law and the Defence of  Duress in 
Murder or Other Cases Arising from Armed Conflict’, in H. Li, S. Yee, and T. Wang (ed.), International Law 
in the Post-Cold War World: Essays in Memory of  Li Haopei (2001), at 83.
52 Nollkaemper, supra note 40, at 281–282.
53 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), 1926 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 7 (25 May), at 52.
54 Nollkaemper, supra note 40, at 281–282.
55 See Kupreskic et al., Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at 540. See also Brownlie, supra note 39, at 23.
56 Jia, supra note 51, at 83.
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one of  which – the teachings of  publicists – is of  highly incidental value in evidencing 
the practice and opinio juris of  states. If  judicial decisions as evidence of  customary 
international law were properly envisaged under Article 38(1)(d), why was the list 
therein not expanded to include other possible types of  evidence, such as national leg-
islation, official proclamations, etc.? It is submitted, therefore, that judicial decisions 
used as material sources of  rules of  international law should be considered under the 
respective sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of  Article 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute.
2. Judicial Decisions Connected to National Law
A distinction is sometimes drawn in the literature between judicial decisions of  national 
courts and judicial decisions of  international courts. Cassese stresses the fundamental 
distinction between international courts and tribunals and municipal courts, in that the 
former are required to apply international law, whereas the latter are primarily required 
to apply domestic law.57 Some authors have cautioned that, even when municipal judges 
may look as if  they are applying international law (and may actually believe that they 
are doing so), in fact all that they are applying is some peculiar rule of  their own national 
law.58 Moreover, it has been observed that some judicial decisions of  national courts pres-
ent a narrow outlook or rest on a very inadequate use of  the international law sources.59
Schwarzenberger identifies six specific grounds on which judicial decisions of  
national courts may be distinguished, including on the basis that national courts nor-
mally may not apply international law which runs counter to the national constitu-
tion, and that, in many countries, the doctrine of  ‘acts of  state’ imposes restrictions on 
the judicial freedom of  national courts.60
Although it may be useful, for the purposes of  Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute, to 
distinguish between different categories of  judicial decisions,61 the critical factor is not 
between judicial decisions of  national courts and judicial decisions of  international 
courts, as such, but rather between judicial decisions of  courts and tribunals primarily 
applying national law (‘national judicial decisions’) and those of  courts and tribunals 
primarily applying international law (‘international judicial decisions’). The empha-
sis, therefore, is not on the ‘type’ of  court or tribunal itself, but rather on the ‘type 
of  law’ being applied. This clarification is useful as the judicial decisions of  national 
courts applying international law (such as the post-World War II courts operating 
by virtue of  Control Council Law No. 1062), as well as of  mixed courts and tribunals 
applying international law, would be regarded as ‘international judicial decisions’.
57 Cassese, supra note 37, at 19.
58 Malanczuk, supra note 10, at 51.
59 Brownlie, supra note 39, at 23.
60 Schwarzenberger, ‘The Inductive Approach to International Law’, 60 Harvard L Rev (1947) 539, at 
554–555.
61 Kupreskic et al. Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at 541.
62 The ICTY Trial Chamber in Kupreskic et al. considered these courts as ‘national courts’: see Kupreskic et al. 
Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at 541. Judges McDonald and Vohrah note that, ‘[i]n relation to the post-
World War Two military tribunals constituted under the London Charter or Control Council Law No. 10, 
doubt remains as to whether any of  these military tribunals were truly “international in character”’: see 
Erdemovic Appeals Judgment, supra note 14, at 53.
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It may be argued that international judicial decisions, if  only because they are based 
on international law,63 are more likely to provide assistance in the determination of  
rules of  international law than perhaps national judicial decisions. This point was 
clearly underscored by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kupreskic et  al., which held that 
‘[t]he value to be assigned to judicial precedents to a very large extent depends on and 
is closely bound up with the legal nature of  the Tribunal, i.e. on whether or not the 
Tribunal is an international court proper’.64
However, it may not be useful to be too categorical on this point, as both interna-
tional and national judicial decisions may, depending on the circumstances, lend 
assistance to the determination of  rules of  international law.65
B Distinction Between Judicial Decisions and the Teachings of  the 
Most Highly Qualified Publicists
Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute treats judicial decisions and teachings of  publicists 
as it were in the same breath.66 Some have questioned why, in view of  the manifest 
risk of  subjectivism, teachings of  publicists have been accorded such an ‘inflated posi-
tion’.67 Schwarzenberger observes that, to a certain extent, the relatively late devel-
opment of  a steady stream of  well-reasoned international judicial decisions may be 
held responsible for this state of  affairs.68 Writing in 1908, Oppenheim provides an 
insight into the state of  affairs immediately prior to the drafting of  the precursor to 
sub-paragraph (d):
Apart from the International Prize Court agreed upon by the Second Hague Peace Conference 
but not yet established, there are no international courts in existence which can define these 
customary rules and apply them authoritatively to cases which themselves become precedents 
binding upon inferior courts. The writers on international law, and in especial the authors of  
treaties, have in a sense to take the place of  the judges and have to pronounce whether there is 
an established custom or not, whether there is a usage only in contradistinction to a custom, 
whether a recognised usage has now ripened into a custom, and the like. … It is for this reason 
that text-books of  international law have so much more importance for the application of  law 
than text-books of  other branches of  the law.69
The international law landscape has developed significantly since this period, and Jia 
asserts that the role of  the teachings of  publicists ‘cannot be the same in our times 
when international tribunals have assumed considerably greater authority in inter-
preting international law by reason not only of  consistency in their reasoning and 
balance in their conclusion, but, far more importantly, of  their power given by States 
to pronounce authoritatively upon legal issues’.70
63 See Kupreskic et al. Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at 542.
64 Ibid., at 538–541.
65 Semanza Trial Judgment, supra note 31, at 336.
66 Jennings, supra note 3, at 6.
67 Schwarzenberger, supra note 60, at 559–562.
68 Ibid.
69 Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 17.
70 Jia, supra note 51, at 78.
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Fitzmaurice famously held, ‘[a] decision is a fact: an opinion, however cogent, 
remains an opinion’.71 The author notes that it is not so much that judicial deci-
sions necessarily possess a higher intrinsic value than the teachings of  publicists, 
but that they have ‘a more direct and immediate impact on the realities of  interna-
tional life’.72
Schwarzenberger considers that there is no other element in Article 38(1) of  the 
ICJ Statute which deserves to be treated with as much reserve as the teachings of  pub-
licists.73 Oppenheim cautions that many of  the rules ostensibly ‘ascertained’ by pub-
licists are ‘mere fancies’.74 Moreover, with respect to the reference in Article 38(1)(d) 
of  the ICJ Statute to the teachings of  the most highly qualified publicists, it has been 
observed that trying to ascertain who are the most highly qualified publicists in the 
field of  international law is problematic in the extreme.75
While the teachings of  publicists are regularly cited in the judgments of  inter-
national criminal courts and tribunals, judicial decisions tend to attract greater 
deference and have a greater bearing than teachings of  publicists. For instance, in 
dismissing a defence submission (relating to participation in a joint criminal enter-
prise), the SCSL Trial Chamber in Taylor noted that he ‘has cited only a textbook, 
but no jurisprudence, in support of  [his] submission’,76 implying that the submis-
sion might have been more persuasive had it been supported by a judicial decision. 
Moreover, in the table of  authorities annexed to some of  the judgments of  those 
courts and tribunals, ‘judicial decisions’ are normally ranked above the ‘secondary’ 
teachings of  publicists.77
This discussion is not meant to downplay the value of  teachings of  publicists 
as important and influential subsidiary means for the determination of  rules of  
international law.78 However, an approach to Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute 
which fails to account for the more direct and immediate impact of  judicial deci-
sions should be avoided.79 Fitzmaurice maintains that Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ 
Statute ‘errs in placing judicial decisions on the same footing as the teachings of  
the most highly qualified publicists’,80 while Jia notes that it is simply unrealistic 
to continue to treat judicial decisions and writings of  publicists as being of  equal 
authority.81
71 Fitzmaurice, supra note 3, at 168.
72 Ibid., emphasis added.
73 Schwarzenberger, supra note 60, at 559–562.
74 Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 36.
75 Schwarzenberger, supra note 60, at 559–560.
76 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Judgment, SCSL-03-01-T, SCSL Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, at 463 
(n. 1093).
77 See the annexed table of  authorities in, inter alia, RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 26. See also Prosecutor 
v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, Santigie Borbor Kanu, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, 
SCSL Appeals Chamber, 22 Feb. 2008.
78 Malanczuk, supra note 10, at 51.
79 Fitzmaurice, supra note 3, at 168.
80 Cited in Jennings, supra note 3, at 9.
81 Jia, supra note 51, at 78.
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4 Concluding Remarks
This article was written as part of  research looking into the approach of  international 
criminal courts and tribunals to the use of  external judicial decisions. In this respect, 
it has been observed that ‘[t]he role of  precedent across international courts has not 
yet been thoroughly studied, since it is only recently that the number of  international 
rulings of  most courts has become sizeable’.82 This research aims to contribute to this 
body of  literature by examining and mapping out the method of  use of  such external 
judicial decisions by these courts and tribunals.
As such, the article has laid out an approach to Article 38(1)(d) of  the ICJ Statute 
based on the formal pronouncements of  international criminal courts and tribunals, 
distilled from their judgments. The next stage of  the research undertakes a study of  
the actual practice of  international criminal courts and tribunals with regard to their 
method of  use of  external judicial decisions, particularly in light of  the lack of  clear 
normative guidance concerning such use.
Finally, this article is also meant as a modest response to the resurgence in the lit-
erature of  a trend towards the deformalization of  international law and a movement 
away ‘from formal law-ascertainment and the resort to non-formal indicators to 
ascertain … legal rules’.83 The emphasis here on a formal approach to Article 38(1)(d) 
of  the ICJ Statute may be seen as a reaction to the view, propounded by some, that the 
process of  ‘deformalization [of  international law] will continue unabated’.84
82 D. Terris, C. Romano, and L. Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who 
Decide the World’s Cases (2007), at 120.
83 d’Aspremont, ‘The Politics of  Deformalization in International Law’, 3 Goettingen J Int’l L (2011) 503, at 
507.
84 Ibid., at 550.
